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Soon after the implementation of the Uruguay
Round,  U.S.  agricultural exports reached their
highest level.  Now many  things, including ex-
change  rates,  factor  into  any  rise  in  exports,
but almost  all  economists  agree  that lowering
trade  barriers  through  trade  agreements  has
been  a  critical  factor.  The  vast  majority-  96
percent-of potential customers  for U.S. prod-
ucts,  including  agricultural  products,  live out-
side the  United  States.  We  must  work  to  in-
crease  our  opportunities  to  sell  into  these
global  markets.
Current U.S.  Farm Policy
When  the  U.S.  Congress  passed  the  Federal
Agriculture  Improvement  and  Reform  Act
(FAIR Act)  in  1996,  the  Administration  indi-
cated  that  it had  serious  reservations  because
it was not clear that the legislation would pro-
vide  adequate  counter-cyclical  assistance  to
producers when markets weakened.  These res-
ervations  have  proven  to  be  accurate,  as  the
collapse  in farm market  income  over the past
two years  has revealed  serious  problems  with
our  farm  income  safety  net.  The  U.S.  Con-
gress  also recognized  this  deficiency  by pass-
ing  a  second  emergency  aid package,  provid-
ing nearly  $8.9 billion in assistance to farmers
and ranchers.  This aid package will be consis-
tent with our WTO commitments  and not pro-
vide any funds for export subsidies. The action
corresponds  to  an  acute  series  of  difficulties
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facing  U.S.  producers,  and  the  cost  is  borne
by the  United States.
Even as we provide this  emergency  aid we
continue  to  look  at  ways  to  strengthen  our
farm  programs  to  provide  a  better  safety  net
for our  farmers  consistent with our WTO  ob-
ligations.  A principal challenge  will be to im-
prove our safety net for family farmers in light
of  the  volatility  of  commodity  prices  these
past two years.  A  specific  challenge  is to im-
prove our risk management and crop insurance
programs  to  protect  farmers  from the  risk of
natural  disasters.  In addition,  we  will work to
continue to  improve  our  conservation  efforts.
We  have  made  significant  progress  in  recent
decades,  but  new  practices  continue  to  offer
great promise in reducing  run-off and improv-
ing habitat.
The Well-Trodden  Road: Trade-Distorting
Policies
In contrast to U.S.  efforts to address trade-dis-
torting policies,  the EU and other WTO mem-
bers  continue  to be unable  to significantly  re-
form their  agricultural  policies.  For example,
the  EU  has  notified  the  WTO  of about  $90
billion  in  support to European  agriculture  an-
nually,  about  three-quarters  of  which  was
trade-distorting  support.  Under  Agenda  2000
reforms,  the EU plans to provide more support
under  blue  box,  or production-limiting,  poli-
cies.  And the EU spends  several billion a year
in  export  subsidies.  This is  the largest  single
distortion  of agricultural  trade  in  the  world.
Let  me be  clear:  The  United  States  does  not
object to the  EU and  other members  support-
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jects  to  is  the  trade-distorting  policy  choices
the EU  and others  make.
The  EU  recently  claimed  that  the  United
States  provides  payments  to  its  farmers  that
are  twice the level  of support  provided  to EU
farmers.  In  reality,  OECD  data  show  that the
EU provides  nearly  10  times more production
support per  acre  than  the  United  States  does;
the EU provides $324 per acre while the Unit-
ed  States  provides  only  $34  per  acre;  Japan
and Korea provide over $4,000 per acre in do-
mestic  production  support.  Most  recently
available  data published  by  the OECD  show
that  domestic  production  supports  in  Japan
and  Korea,  on  average  for  1996-98,  provide
over  60  percent  of  farm  income;  in  the  EU
production  supports  account  for 39 percent  of
farm  income,  while  U.S.  production  supports
for  the  same  period  provide  only  17  percent
of U.S.  farm income.
Developing  countries  are  looking  to  the
United  States,  the  EU,  and  Japan  for  leader-
ship in developing rational  agricultural policy.
The  United  States  has  shown  leadership  by
greatly reducing its export subsidies,  especial-
ly  on grains,  and shifting  to de-linked domes-
tic  support.  While  many  European  govern-
ments  recognize  that  reform  is  essential,
internal  reforms  have  brought  only  minor
changes  in the past two decades.  The Agenda
2000 package  adopted by the EU is no excep-
tion,  and  unfortunately  represents  a  retreat
from the  original set  of reforms  advocated by
the European Commission. We need continued
global  reform in the WTO  to tighten  rules  on
trade-distorting  domestic  supports  and  elimi-
nate export subsidies  so that countries increas-
ingly  deal  with  support  for  agriculture  in  a
non-trade  distorting  way.
The  promise  of  trade  liberalization  in  to-
day's global  economy can  be seen  in the con-
clusion  of  the  U.S.-China  bilateral  WTO
agreement  on November  15,  1999. Under  this
agreement,  China  agreed  to  the  following,
which  also  coincides  for  the  most  part  with
our objectives  for the new round:  1) Eliminate
export subsidies,  2) Improve  market access  by
significantly  cutting  tariffs  and  establishing  a
tariff-rate  quota  system  for  imports  of  bulk
commodities,  3)  Provide  the  right  to  import
and distribute  products  without going through
state-trading enterprises,  and 4) Eliminate san-
itary  and  phytosanitary  barriers  not based  on
sound  science.  While  USDA  estimates  that
this  agreement  could  increase  U.S.  exports
roughly  $2  billion  annually,  it  is  difficult  to
predict exactly  how much the gains from trade
will  be.  Several  factors,  including  growth  in
China's  economy,  investment,  and market de-
velopment  will  influence  these gains.
U.S.  Goals
I'd  like  to  take  a  minute  and  briefly  review
U.S.  agricultural objectives  as we headed into
Seattle  before  discussing  what  went  on  at the
Ministerial  and where  we go  from here.
Eliminate Export Subsidies
According  to  the  World  Trade  Organization
(WTO)  as of  1996,  the European  Union  (EU)
accounted  for  an  astonishing  83.5  percent of
total  agriculture  export  subsidies  worldwide;
the United  States  accounted  for  only  1.4  per-
cent.  Our  goal,  and  the  goal  of  many  other
members  of the  WTO,  is  to eliminate  all  ex-
port  subsidies  in the new  round.
In addition to eliminating all remaining ex-
port  subsidies  for  agricultural  products,  we
want  to  clarify  and  strengthen  rules  on  mea-
sures  that  may allow  circumvention  of export
subsidy  disciplines,  such  as  the  use  of  state
trading  enterprises,  and  disguised  export  sub-
sidies (e.g.,  pricing  policies).
Reform State Trading Enterprises (STE's)
Related  to  the elimination of export  subsidies
is the whole issue of State Trading Enterprises
(STE's).  These  monopoly  importers  and  ex-
porters  can  distort trade and provide  an unfair
advantage  to  the  governments  authorizing
them.  Both the Canadian Wheat Board and the
Australian  Wheat  Board  are  examples  of ex-
porting  STE's  that  benefit  from  exclusive
rights  and privileges  including monopoly con-
trol  over  procurement,  handling,  and  distri-
bution.  Price  discrimination  and  pooling  ar-
rangements  employed  by  these  STE's  may
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circumvent  export  subsidy disciplines  already
agreed  to  in  the Uruguay  Round.  Our  objec-
tive is to  impose  further disciplines  on  STE's
to avoid trade distortions and make them much
more transparent.  One suggestion  is to require
them to report  grain sales as we in the United
States  do  under  our  Export  Grain  Reporting
System.
Reduce  Tariffs, Expand Access,  and Improve
Implementation of Tariff-rate Quotas (TRQs)
Under  the Uruguay Round  Agreement,  devel-
oped  countries  cut their  tariffs  by  an average
of 36  percent,  but the  tariffs most  U.S.  prod-
ucts  face  remain  too high-about  50  percent
on average-compared  to much lower average
rates (below  10  percent)  for products  entering
the United  States.  Our  objective  is  to reduce
tariffs  substantially  and expand market  access
under tariff-rate  quotas by increasing the quota
amount  and  decreasing  the  tariff  outside  the
quota.
Tighten Rules on Trade-distorting  Domestic
Support
Protective  tariffs  and  unfair  export  subsidies
frequently  are used  because  domestic  subsidy
regimes  distort  the production  incentives fac-
ing  farmers.  At  the  Ministerial,  we  proposed
further  reductions  in  existing  trade-distorting
support  and  encouraged  non-trade  distorting
approaches  for  supporting  farmers  and  rural
communities  everywhere.
Preserve the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement
The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures  (SPS)  is  one  of the  landmark  pro-
visions  from  the Uruguay  Round.  It  requires
that import  measures  imposed  for the protec-
tion  of  human,  animal,  or  plant  health  be
based  on  sound  science.  We  went  to  Seattle
with  the  goal  of preserving  the  SPS  Agree-
ment.
Facilitate Trade in New  Technologies, such
as Biotechnology
In Seattle, we wanted to help clear the way for
the products  of biotechnology.  Biotechnology
is  already transforming  medicine  as  we know
it.  Pharmaceuticals  such  as  human insulin for
diabetes,  interferon  and  other  cancer medica-
tions,  antibiotics and vaccines  are  all products
of genetic  engineering.
Agricultural  biotechnology  has  enormous
potential  to  help  combat  hunger.  Genetically
modified  plants  have  the  potential  to  resist
killer weeds that are,  literally,  starving people
in  Africa  and  other  parts  of  the  developing
world.  Biotechnology  can  help us  solve some
of the most vexing environmental problems. It
can  reduce  pesticide  use,  increase yields,  im-
prove  nutritional  content,  and  use less water.
These products  have experienced problems
in gaining market access, especially  in the EU,
which  has  failed  to  approve  agricultural  bio-
technology  corn  varieties  approved  and plant-
ed in the United States, resulting in $200 mil-
lion  in  lost  sales  annually  for  U.S.  farmers.
Nevertheless,  we  will  continue  to  work  with
WTO  members to  urge that government poli-
cies  that determine  which varieties will  be al-
lowed  on  the  marketplace  are  scientifically,
not politically,  based  and that new  regulations
minimize  the impact on trade.
The Seattle Ministerial
The Seattle Ministerial was intended to lay the
framework  for  a  new  round.  The  only  thing
we were trying to do in Seattle was to develop
such  a  framework  that  would  establish  our
goals  for the  next round  and  enable  us  to  go
into detailed negotiations starting  this year and
extending  over the next  three years.  Like oth-
ers  at  Seattle,  we  were  disappointed  that  the
135  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  mem-
bers  did not reach  final  agreement  to  open  a
new round  of trade talks,  but we  are  not dis-
heartened.
There  were  a  number  of reasons  why  the
talks  were  suspended,  including  the  fact  that
we  faced  many  complicated  issues,  some  of
which  are  new  to  the  world  trading  system.
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We also found that the WTO has outgrown the
processes  that were  appropriate  50  years  ago
when there were  30 or so WTO members,  not
the  135  members  we  have today.  Because  of
this, member  countries  agreed  that a more  in-
clusive and transparent  process needs to be es-
tablished  to  accommodate  a  larger  and  more
diverse  membership.
Developing Countries
For  example,  developing  countries  claim the
WTO needs to provide better opportunities for
wider  participation  by  all  members  in  the
WTO  decision-making  process.  Developing
countries  have  also  complained  that they  are
not accruing  the benefits from trade that more
developed  countries  are  achieving.  These con-
cerns  need  to  be  addressed.  Reasons  for  this
complaint  include  trade-distorting agricultural
policies  in  some  countries  that  place  an  im-
mense  and unfair burden  on developing coun-
try farmers  and the need for capacity building
in  the  developing  countries  themselves.  We
are encouraging  the World  Bank  and its sister
agencies to not only help in capacity  building,
but  to  continue  to  support  agricultural  mod-
ernization  and development  in these countries.
While many will claim that the talks in Se-
attle were  a  failure,  in fact for  agriculture we
made  significant  progress  in all the objectives
I just  laid  out-market  access,  domestic  sup-
port,  and export  subsidies.
Export Subsidies
On the issue  of the elimination  of export  sub-
sidies,  Europe  is  clearly  isolated.  The  rest of
the world  disagrees  with Europe  on this issue,
and that includes  the United States, the Cairns
Group  of  exporting  nations,  and  developing
nations.  And by Europe  I don't mean just the
EU,  but  Europe  broadly,  including  Switzer-
land  and Norway  who,  although  they  are  not
formal  members  of  the  EU,  aligned  them-
selves with the EU in opposition to this effort.
Biotech
Going into Seattle the United States advocated
that a working group be set up to address some
of the  current  problems  we  are  experiencing
in biotechnology. What was proposed was that
a working  group  be established  to study  how
we can  improve  the approval  procedures  that
govern  biotechnology  in  various  countries.
Then there  would be  the possibility of devel-
oping new WTO disciplines  in this area.
Export Credits
We discussed a proposal to reduce export sub-
sidies while  simultaneously  taking  similar ac-
tion on the subsidy component  of other forms
of  export  assistance,  including  export  credit
and credit  guarantee  programs.  In  this regard,
the United  States  is committed  to  working  in
the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation
and  Development  (OECD)  to  reach  a  mean-
ingful  agreement  on export  credit  and  credit
guarantee  programs  that will  fulfill our  WTO
obligations  while preserving  our ability to use
credit in the future.  These negotiations  are not
simply about U.S. export credit guarantee pro-
grams,  but  about  everybody's  export  credit
and  credit guarantee  programs;  France,  Cana-
da,  Australia  and  others  have these  programs
as  well.
Where Do  We  Go From Here?
The question  on all our minds is where do we
go from here?  I believe that for the credibility
of  the  WTO,  we  must  start  negotiations
promptly.  Article  20  of  the  Uruguay  Round
Agreement  on  Agriculture  states,  "Members
agree  that negotiations for continuing the pro-
cess  will  be initiated  one  year before  the end
of  the  implementation  period."  That  is  why
countries  are  committed  under  the  "built-in-
agenda"  to renew  negotiations  on  agriculture
and  services  promptly,  this year. If we  do not
get  started  now,  we  risk  damaging  the  credi-
bility  of  the  entire  international  trading  sys-
tem-a trading system built carefully, step-by-
step for  more than five  decades.
In the  General  Council meeting  of Febru-
ary  7,  2000,  WTO  members  agreed  to  begin
agricultural  negotiations  in  March  and we  in-
tend  to use this process  to push  ahead  on our
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agenda to liberalize  international  trade in food
and agricultural  goods.
It  is  not just  the  United  States,  EU,  and
Japan that will gain the most from the start of
negotiations  to  liberalize  agricultural  trade.
Developing  countries  have  much  to  gain  as
well.  Without  an  open  international  trading
system,  some  developing  countries  are  more
likely  to  face  the menace  of food insecurity.
Without an open  trading system, they will not
gain better market  access for their agricultural
products.  So  agricultural  negotiations  are  not
just an  effort  for developed  countries-  devel-
oping  countries  also  have  a very  real interest
in making sure  they  are  successful.
Conclusion
In  conclusion,  let's  consider  Robert  Frost's
well  known poem,  The Road Not Taken.  "...
Two  roads  diverged in  a wood,  and I-I  took
the  one  less  traveled  by,  And that  has  made
all  the  difference."  Our  situation  now  is  not
so different  from what Robert Frost describes.
One  can  remain  on  the  well-trodden  road  of
protectionism  in  agriculture,  with  which  we
are  most familiar.  That road would  lead us to
years  of negotiations  as  we  saw  in  the  Uru-
guay  Round,  resulting  in  the  continuation  of
trade-distorting  protectionist  policies,  which
have adversely  affected  world prices, efficient
agricultural  producers,  especially  those  in de-
veloping  countries,  and the  environment.
Or  we can  take  the road  less traveled,  the
road  not as  worn or  well  trodden,  and  move
forward, promptly.  This would  take  courage,
courage  on  the part  of the  United  States,  the
EU,  Japan,  and  other nations.  But we  can  do
it.  If we recommit  ourselves,  we  can conduct
meaningful  negotiations  that  result in  signifi-
cant  reform  for  agricultural  trade.  We  have
seen  how  much  we  can  accomplish  when we
work together.
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